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Singer's basic principle about equality of consideration of interests seems to derive from the idea that
the central constraint of morality is that one cannot, as
a moral agent, make special exceptions for one's own
case. This principle leads to a ranking of interests that
is invariant under identity shifts. Is it worse that I should
avoid some inconvenience or that you should lose your
left foot? If I am thinking morally, I cannot subordinate
your foot to my convenience, since it is clear that I
would feel quite differently if it were my foot that was
at risk. Thus, to appreciate the importance of your foot,
relative to my convenience, I need only, as we say, put
myself in your shoes. No one disagrees that it is worse
to starve to death than to wear shabby clothing;
therefore, I should not buy new clothes but contribute
to famine relief (or prevention).
Once we begin to question having special privileges
to ourselves, or our friends or family or race or sex or
nation, we must be led to ask whether we can give
preferential treatment on the basis of species. Singer's
answer is that we cannot, and that the conventional piety
about "the sanctity of human life," and the concomitant
unsanctity of nonhuman animal life, must be rejected
as immoral. Any· attempt to show that all and only
humans are morally special must fail, in Singer's view,
since any plausible, morally relevant characteristic will
either be possessed by some nonhumans or will not be
possessed by some humans. This appeal to marginal

Peter Singer did not invent the animal liberation
movement, nor did he coin its central term, speciesism.
But he made both famous, beginning with his essay,
"Animal Liberation", which appeared in the New York
Review ofBooks in April, 1973. His book of the same
title appeared two and a half years later, repeating the
main philosophical arguments of the essay, but adding
detailed description of animal experimentation and
factory farming; connecting the questions about animals
with the issue about world hunger; and providing both
a short history of speciesism and a survey of its
contemporary arguments. l It is, and will probably
remain, the most distinguished philosophical text to
include a cookbook. 2
Few philosophy books have had as much popular
success as Animal Liberation. It has served as the bible,
and sometimes as the calling card, of the animal
liberation movement during the past decade and a half,
paving the way for Tom Regan's more recent volume,
TheCaseforAnimalRights. 3 Though Singer and Regan
are in substantial agreement when it comes to practical
questions, they disagree fundamentally about the basis
of moral claims.
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cases is employed with great effectiveness by Singer.
To be consistent, it seems, we must either treat animals
better or humans worse.
Singer is actually after a bit of both, though some
readers may have missed the implication.4 I doubt that
many of the "good terrorists" who break into
laboratories, release experimental animals, and leave
behind a copy of Animal Liberation would be equally
keen to insure that necessary medical research is done
on suitably retarded human subjects. This side of
Singer's utilitarian position is harder to miss in his
later works. 5
AnimalLiberation has bren called "the greatest book
ever written on animal experimentation,"6 and some
have taken Singer to be attaeJring animal experimentation in the same wholesale way he attacks factory
farming and, more generally, meat-eating. In fact,
however, Singer's attack must be seen to be limited to
(1) experimentation that is useless (or where the value
of the actual or expected results is outweighed by the
suffering involved in the experimental procedures) and
(2) experimentation that violates the doctrine of equal
consideration of interests by using nonhumans where
we would not (even think to) use humans.
In a recent statement on experimentation, Singer
makes a couple of revealing remarks. The debate
between pro- and anti-vivi~tionism often concerns the
availability of alternative, nonvivi~tionist modes of
investigation. Animal experimenters claim that animalrights activists exaggerate the availability (reliability,
suitability, or practicality) of alternatives. Animal
advocates, in reply, insist that there was very little
interest in looking for alternatives before public clamor
began. Singer points out that there is a deeper issue:

that we have a right) to obtain such knowledge by
such means.
Yet Singer is committed, as a utilitarian, to
recognizing that there are at least possible cUcumstances
in which such experimentation would be obligatory.
Bentham himself found no objection to

the putting of dogs and other inferior animals
to pain, in the way of medical experiment,
when that experiment has a determinate object,
beneficial to mankind, accompanied with a fair
prospect of the accomplishment of it.s
This is, indeed, not far from the vivisectionist's usual
apologia Singer says that he hopes young would-be
researchers will
twn instead to tasks such as health education
and the distribution of our existing medical
techniques to those places where the need is
greatest. In that way they will make a greater
contribution to human health than they would
every be likely to make by experimenting on
animals. 9
No doubt, there is much to Singer's claim. The
extension of existing health-care knowledge to the
world at large might well be of more pressing
importance, at present, than the acquisition of new
knowledge. Average care for all might be preferable to
better and better care for comparatively few. (How
important are heart-transplants during famines?)
Still, it may be difficult not to feel that changing
circumstances (e. g., AIDSI~ can raise the premium
on new knowledge. In any event, were the bright day
of health equality ever to dawn, utilitarians would be
faced anew with the issues Singer circumvents in the
above remark.
In 1985, Singer published his own retrospective of
"Ten Years of Animal Liberation," reviewing in the
process works by R. G. Frey, who as a utilitarian has
attacked animal liberation, and Tom Regan, who has
attacked utilitarianism as a defender of animal rights. ll
Singer observes that Frey and Regan both "believe that
it is not clear that utilitarianism leads to vegetarianism
in the actual world in which we live."12 Frey insists,
not very convincingly, that the bad consequences of
mass vegetarianism would outweigh its good
consequences. Therefore, he thinks, utilitarianism does

Some human diseases involve breakdowns of
complex interactions in whole organisms, and
no alternative to the use of a whole living
organism is lilcely to assist us in understanding
the nature of such diseases-although if we
give genuine consideration to the interests of
nonhuman animals we will not assume that
this fact alone entitles us to use them to obtain
this understanding,?
Singer's assumption here is that a rejection of
speciesism means that the fact that we can learn about
certain diseases only by "sacrificing" whole animals
does not by itself entail that it is right for us (let alone
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not require us to become vegetarians or foreswear
vivisection--au contraire. 13 Regan believes that
utilitarian objections to factory fanning and animal
experimentation do not go to the root of the matter. After
all, if the consequences were different, utilitarianism
would require us to be carnivores, or to experiment,
so utilitarianism is incapable of expressing an
appropriately deep respect for the inherent value ofother
creatures as subjects-of-a-life.
In response to Frey, Singer emphasizes all the good
consequences that would flow from vegetarianism. It
is likely that most readers would find Singer's case
more compelling; his prose is certainly more effective.
But the spectacle can only remind us how Wledifying
consequentialist rows usually are. Consequentialist
reasoning is something that often seems to make sense
on a small scale, but quickly becomes intuitively
unmanageable as considerations become more and
more complex.
In listing the happy consequences of vegetarianism,
Singer observes that "since so much ofour meat is grain
fed, and this is a notoriously wasteful process, there
will be much more grain available for those who need
it most"-i. e., the world's hWlgry.14 This encapsulates
a whole chapler from AnimalLiberation. This argument
may seem to have an air of economic unreality about
it Are we to believe that if wealthy meat-producers
were to stop paying handsomely for grain, the same
land would be used to produce the same amoWlt of grain
to be donated to the world's hWlgry? The argument
seems naive. (Are we to make decisions about the
consequences of vegetarianism on the assumption that
everyone has been convinced by Singer's argument in
"Famine, Affluence, and Morality"15 and will act on
it? Or may we suppose that economic and political
forces might keep our "sacrifice" from alleviating the
world's endemic undernourishment?)
Another possibility is that the utilitarian thing to do
might be to take the immense profits derived from meat
production and spend them on population control.
(Though Singer has maintained, contra Garrett Hardin's
consequentialist arguments, that eventual famine
catastrophe is not inevitable, he has conceded that direct
food relief might not be the required course ofaction. 16)
What the consequences of our actions will be
depends on how much of what we ought to do is actually
done. And what we actually ought to do depends on
what the consequences of our actioos will be. It is not easy
to remain undaunted in the face of such complexities.
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In this particular case, a solution may be possible.
We can understand Singer's argument as a response to
the claim that since there are so many starving people
in the world, vegetarianism must be wrong. In other
words, a commitment to vegetarianism need not be
incompatible with a commitment to alleviate world
hunger. We might grant this much without embracing
the more positive claim that vegetarianism would
provide an avenue for such alleviation. Understood in
this modest way, Singer's argument provides an
unexpected reply to the critic who suggests that starving
people are more important than suffering animals.
Singer can say: if you are concerned about starving
people, then you should become vegetarian.
Singer recommends vegetarianism as a kind of
boycott. Part of the strength of this tactic is that it
appeals to deontologists as much as to utilitarians. The
utiliarian can say: By not buying meat, I do not
contribute to causing animal suffering. The deontologist
can say: By not buying meat, I do not take part in a
wrongful action.
Singer does not recommend a boycott ofall medical
products produced through animal testing. To some,
this has seemed an inconsistency, but as we have seen,
Singer cannot, as a utilitarian, oppose all possible foons
of animal experimentation. When experimenters point
out that a given procedure is based on animal
experimentation, Singer can say that "to apply the
treatment now does not require further animal
experimentation."l? We can use knowledge wrongfully
acquired, it seems, so long as our use does no further
wrong. Of course, our purchase of drugs which have
been tested on animals provides economic support for
the companies that develop such materials, just as our
purchase of meat provides support for factory farmers.
It may be that the social complexities that block
abolition even of objectionable fonns of experimentation are as baffling as those complexities which block
just distribution of the world's food supply. As David
Jaggar has said:
Individual scientists currently have little
control over the goals and conduct of their
research ... [T]he current social order is
committed systematically to the continuation
of painful experimentation on animals. Our
current social system will continue to set
research goals that include the development
of ever more lethal weapons, it will continue
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S See, e. g. Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press,
1979) and, with Helga Kuhse, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford
University Press. 1985).

to proliferate unnecessary luxury items whose
safety must be tested, and it will continue to
pollute the environment with carcinogens and
other toxic substances for which cures must
be found. Enormous numbers of animals will
suffer pain in all these research projects. Their
pain can be eliminated only by a radical
transformation of social order which generates
this kind of scientific researeh. 18

6 This characterization is quoted on the back of the
paperback edition (New York: Avon, 1977).

7 "Unkind to Animals," New York Review of Books, 2
February 1989, 38.

8 Letter to the Editor of the Morning Chronicle, in John
Bowring, ed., Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838-1843)
[reprinted, New York: Russell & Russell, 1962], vol. 10,
549-550.

Singer has never been shy about calling for radical
changes in the way people live, nor about defending
philosophers' title to be "moral experts." In one of his
earliest essays he declared:

9 "Unkind

10 But see Singer's remarks in a letter in the New York
Review ofBooks, 13 April 1989, 52.

Moral philosophers have, then, certain
advantages which could make them, relative
to those who lack these advantages, experts in
matters of morals. Of course, to be moral
experts, it would be necessary for moral
philosophers to do some fact-finding on
whatever issue they were considering. Given
a readiness to tackle normative issues, and
to look at the relevant facts, it would be
surprising if moral philosophers were not, in
general, better suited to arrive at the right, or
soundly based, moral conclusions than nonphilosophers. Indeed, if this were not the case,
one might wonder whether moral philosophy
was worthwhile. 19

11

exchange with Regan, "file Dog in the Lifeboat," New York
Review ofBooks, 25 April 1985, 57, and by a further essay on
Regan in the special issue of the Monist devoted to Regan's
Case, "Animal Liberation or Animal Rights," Monist vol.
70, no. 1 (1987) 3-14.
12 "Ten Years

of Animal Liberation," 51.

13 1have discussed Frey's book in the PhilosophicalReview,
vol. 95, no. 2 (April 1986) 277-279.
14 ''Ten Years of Animal Liberation," 52. James Rachels
has also found this argument appealing;
his "Vegetarianism
and 'The Other Weight Problem' ," in William Aiken and
Hugh LaFollette, eds., World Hunger and Moral Obligation
(Englewood Cliffs, N. 1.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 180-193.

cr.

IS "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and
Public Affairs vol. 1, no. 3 (1972), 229-243. Reprinted in
Aiken and LaFollette, op. cit~ 22-23, with a Postscript, 33-36.
16 See Singer's Postscript, in Aiken and Lafollette, op. cit.,
and his Practical Ethics, 176-179. For Hardin, see, e. g.,
"Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor," in
Aiken and Lafollette.
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See, e.g., Animal Liberation, 22-23
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''Ten Years of Animal Liberation," New York Review of

Books, 17 January 1985, 46-52. This was followed by an

If the moral philosophy of the past two decades has
been worthwhile, that has been in part because of the
conception of applied ethics exemplified throughout
Singer's extensive body of work, and pre-eminently in
Animal Liberation.

4

to Animals," 38.
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